UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/969
19 October 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 OCTOBER 1998 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 15 October 1998 (S/1998/968) concerning your decision to appoint Ambassador Ayité Jean-Claude Kpakpo (Benin) as Senior United Nations Adviser to the Facilitator of the Burundi peace process, His Excellency Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the decision contained in your letter.

(Signed) Jeremy GREENSTOCK
President of the Security Council

98-31007 (E) 191098

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1998/970
19 October 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 OCTOBER 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF KENYA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith a communiqué on the security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo issued by the heads of State of the three East African States of Kenya, the United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda, following their meeting in Nairobi on 18 October 1998 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Njuguna M. MAHUGU, OGW
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-31040 (E) 191098

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ANNEX

Communiqué of the East African Cooperation Consultative Summit of heads of State on the security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

1. At the invitation of Daniel T. Arap Moi, President of Kenya, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of Uganda, and William Benjamin Mkapa, President of the United Republic of Tanzania, attended the East African Cooperation Consultative Summit on the security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Nairobi on 18 October 1998.

2. The Summit noted with grave concern the escalation of the conflict, which has taken a wider dimension threatening to engulf the whole region, including the East Africa subregion.

3. Observing that the crisis was impacting negatively on the region, and precipitating an influx of refugees into neighbouring ccuntries, the displacement of populations, threats of genocide and a decline in trade and investments, the Summit underscored the urgent need to address the situation.

4. The Summit reaffirmed the unity and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in accordance with the principles of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Charter of the United Nations.

5. The Summit also reaffirmed the need to address the genuine security concerns of the countries neighbouring the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

6. The Summit examined all options for speeding up a resolution to the Democratic Republic of the Congo crisis and called for:

(a) Immediate cessation of hostilities;

(b) Immediate negotiation of a ceasefire agreement and a troop standstill;

(c) Taking of measures to address the security concerns of neighbouring countries;

(d) Security for marginalized groups;

(e) Orderly withdrawal of all foreign troops;

(f) Initiation of an all-inclusive political dialogue;

(g) Emplacement of a neutral international peacekeeping force under the auspices of OAU and the United Nations.

7. The Summit resolved that urgent measures would be taken to facilitate the implementation of these decisions. In this regard, the heads of State mandated their ministers in charge of foreign affairs, regional cooperation and defence to undertake a follow-up of the decisions.

8. The East African Cooperation member States expressed their deep concern regarding the maintenance of peace and security in the region. In this regard, they agreed to support efforts already under way by Southern African Development Community (SADC) member States in consultation with OAU and the United Nations.

9. The heads of State visited the site of the bomb blast of 7 August 1998 and laid wreaths in remembrance of all those who had lost their lives in the terrorist attack. The Summit condemned all acts of terrorism and called for concerted efforts to combat and eradicate terrorism in all its forms.

10. Presidents Museveni and Mkapa expressed their appreciation to their host, President Moi, the Government and the people of Kenya for the warm welcome and hospitality extended to them during their stay in Kenya.

UNITED NATIONS **A S**

General Assembly
Security Council

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A/53/517
S/1998/971
19 October 1998
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-third session
Agenda item 7
NOTIFICATION BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL UNDER ARTICLE 12, PARAGRAPH 2, OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Letter dated 12 October 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to address you with regard to document A/53/357, dated 10 September 1998, circulated under item 7 of the provisional agenda of the fifty-third session of the General Assembly and entitled "Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations", which contains a summary statement on matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration since the previous statement submitted to the General Assembly at its fifty-second session in document A/52/392.

In this connection, I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Republic of Cuba is interested in maintaining on the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized all the items submitted by the Republic of Cuba for the attention of that principal organ of the United Nations, as included in the notification submitted to the General Assembly in document A/53/357.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Bruno RODRIGUEZ PARRILLA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-31019 (E) 191098 191098

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/972
19 October 1998
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 17 OCTOBER 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that 21 mines, bombs, missiles and other ordnance left behind by the 1991 30-Power aggression against Iraq were found and disposed of in all parts of the country between 1 August and 30 September 1998. The items included American-made cluster bombs as well as spherical bomblets, strip bombs, aerial bombs and artillery shells, and they were found in the following governorates: Ninawa, Basrah, Najaf, Muthanna, Anbar and Maysan.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-31076 (E) 201098 201098

UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly
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A/53/519
S/1998/973
19 October 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-third session
Agenda item 62
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Letter dated 16 October 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 16 October 1998, addressed to you by His Excellency, Mr. Aytuğ Plümer, representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 62, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Volkan VURAL
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-31058 (E) 201098

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ANNEX

Letter dated 16 October 1998 from Mr. Aytuğ Plümer, addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letters dated 16 September and 2 October 1998 addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative at the United Nations (A/53/399-S/1998/864 and A/53/460-S/1998/917, respectively) which contain allegations regarding cultural property in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

Previous allegations regarding the so-called "plundering of the religious and cultural identity" of Northern Cyprus have been amply dealt with in our previous communications addressed to you, most recently in my letter dated 24 July 1998 (A/52/997-S/1998/697). Such unfounded Greek Cypriot charges are aimed at covering up the fact that it has been the Greek Cypriot side that has systematically tried to eradicate the Turkish Muslim heritage of Cyprus, in particular during the ethnic cleansing campaign directed against the Turkish Cypriot people between 1963 and 1974. There is ample graphic evidence of the deliberate destruction by Greek Cypriots, with the support of Greece, of historical and religious monuments in Cyprus during this period. I am enclosing herewith a list of the 103 mosques and Muslim shrines that had been the target of such actions until Turkey's legitimate intervention in Cyprus on 20 July 1974, in the wake of a coup d'état carried out by Greece and its collaborators in Cyprus with the aim of annexing the island (see appendix). The long list of devastated mosques and other places of worship testify to the extent and volume of the crimes perpetrated against the Islamic character of the island and the massive campaign of ethnic cleansing directed against the Turkish Cypriot people.

Despite the Greek Cypriot representative's rhetoric to the effect that the Greek Cypriot administration "zealously protects all places of worship belonging to all faiths in Cyprus" and the lip-service paid to the improvement of "existing international conventions for the protection of the world cultural properties", the Greek Cypriot side continues, on the one hand, to show utter contempt for what is left of the Turkish Islamic heritage in South Cyprus where Ottoman Turkish shrines are under threat of disintegration owing to total neglect and, on the other hand, systematically blocks any external financial or technical assistance to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus for conservation purposes.

The policy of the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is to protect the cultural heritage of Northern Cyprus irrespective of its religious and cultural origins. The Department of Antiquities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the competent authority charged with protecting and preserving cultural sites in the Republic, has to realize its objectives with limited internal resources owing to the inhuman and illegal blockage of any international assistance to the Turkish Cypriot side by the Greek Cypriot administration. Within this context, I wish to emphasize that preservation of cultural and historical sites through reuse is carried out in accordance with international instruments governing the preservation of cultural heritage.

In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the allegations of the Greek Cypriot side on the subject of cultural heritage have no basis and are utterly unjustified. With these allegations, the Greek Cypriot side attempts to portray Cyprus as a Hellenic island with an exclusively Christian Orthodox background, in spite of the reality that Turkish Cypriots are sovereign equals and that the island has a rich Turkish Islamic heritage owing to centuries-long Turkish rule. Such efforts on the part of the Greek Cypriot side demonstrate that it is far from ready to acknowledge the existing realities on the island with a view to arriving at a partnership settlement based on sovereign equality.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its appendix would be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 62, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Aytuğ PLÜMER
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

APPENDIX

List of mosques and Muslim shrines destroyed or damaged by Greek Cypriots until 20 July 1974

1. Omerge Mosque
2. Bayraktar Mosque
3. Tahtakala Mosque
4. Araplar Mosque
5. Dükkanlar Önü Mosque
6. Zeytinlik Mosque
7. Aşaği Deftera Mosque
8. Aşaği Lákadamya Mosque
9. Türkeli Mosque
10. Küçük Kaymakli Mosque
11. Yilmazköy Mosque
12. Derelikôy Mosque
13. Erenköy Mosque
14. Gaziler Mosque
15. Dereli Mosque
16. Demirhan Mosque
17. Minarelikôy Mosque
18. Matyat Mosque
19. Madenlikôy Mosque
20. Katalyonda Mosque
21. Somolof Mosque
22. Akaca Mosque
23. Güzelyurt Mosque
24. Orunda Mosque
25. Peristerona Mosque
26. Denya Mosque
27. Kurtboğan Mosque
28. Bozdağ Mosque
29. Flâsu Mosque
30. Mansur Mosque
31. Dali Mosque
32. Solya Mosque

33. Eylence Mosque
34. Balikesir Mosque
35. Arpalik Mosque
36. Aybifan Mosque
37. Mamundali Mosque
38. Ceyhan Mosque
39. Yuvali Mosque
40. Ovalik Mosque
41. Çatalköy Mosque
42. Beşparmak Mosque
43. Lapta Mosque
44. Kömürcü Mosque
45. Karşiyaka Mosque
46. Tepebaşi Mosque
47. Şirinevler Mosque
48. Hz. Ömer Shrine Mosque
49. Girne Mosque
50. Aga Cafer Pasha Mosque
51. Acemzade Mecidi Mosque
52. Zahuri Mosque
53. Koraku Mosque
54. Aredyu Mosque
55. Gürpinar Mosque
56. Linu Mosque
57. Yağmuralan Mosque
58. Süleymaniye Mosque
59. Selçuklu Mosque
60. Kuzucuk Mosque
61. Çayirova Mosque
62. Mutluyaka Mosque
63. Paşaköy Mosque
64. Alaniçi (Magosa) Mosque
65. Geçitkale (Magosa) Mosque
66. Adaçay Mosque
67. Boğaztepe Mosque
68. Pinarli Mosque
69. Atlilar Mosque

70. Bahçalar (Yeni İskele) Mosque
71. Yedikonuk Mosque
72. Elmali Mosque
73. Taşlica Mosque
74. Ceylân Mosque
75. Alsandik Mosque
76. Yerovasi Mosque
77. Bağlarbaşi Mosque
78. Silifke Mosque
79. Çeliktaş (Limasol) Mosque
80. Baf Mosque
81. Eledyu Mosque
82. Amarget Mosque
83. Aktepe Mosque
84. Akkargi Mosque
85. Poli Mosque
86. Hulu Mosque
87. Girittera Mosque
88. Olukönü Mosque
89. Çinarli Mosque
90. Aşaği Baf Mosque
91. Haci Mehmet Tekke Mosque
92. Turabi Mosque and Shrine
93. Düzova (Lárnaka) Mosque
94. Akkor Mosque
95. Aksu Mosque
96. Maroni Mosque
97. Kalavason Mosque
98. Lefkara Mosque
99. Çamlibel (Lárnaka) Mosque
100. Akhisar Mosque
101. Ummu Haram Mosque
102. Aplenda Mosque
103. Alâ-tirke Mosque

UNITED
NATIONS

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19 October 1998

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-third session
Agenda item 62
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Letter dated 19 October 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 19 October 1998, addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Aytuğ Plümer, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 62, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Volkan VURAL
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX

Letter dated 19 October 1998 from Mr. Aytuğ Plümer addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letters dated 30 September, 7 October and 9 October 1998 addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative at the United Nations, which contain allegations regarding "violations of the national airspace of the Republic and of the flight information region of Nicosia" (A/53/450-S/1998/909, A/53/476-S/1998/935 and A/53/495-S/1998/950, respectively).

As stated in our previous communications addressed to you, most recently in my letter dated 25 September 1998 (A/53/438-S/1998/896), repeated allegations by the Greek Cypriot side on so-called "airspace and FIR violations" are totally unfounded and are rejected in toto by our authorities. The present allegations do not merit a detailed reply as they are of a similar nature. I wish to emphasize, once again, that flights within the sovereign airspace and flight information region of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the appropriate authorities of the State. The Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say over flights within the national airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

The Greek Cypriot regime in South Cyprus, while claiming to possess sovereignty and jurisdiction over the island as a whole, is precipitating further tension by pursuing a massive rearmament campaign and maintaining an offensive posture against the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. At a time when Your Excellency's Deputy Special Representative Dame Ann Hercus has started a new process of on-island contacts with both sides with a view to reducing tensions, the Greek Cypriot National Guard units together with an armada of Army, Navy and Air Force units belonging to Greece are preparing to stage provocative military manoeuvres in and around South Cyprus during the period 20 to 25 October 1998. It is reported that F-16 and A-7 warplanes from Greece will be deployed at the Paphos military air base in South Cyprus. These continuing provocations and the planned deployment of the sophisticated S-300 missiles in South Cyprus, in the context of the Joint Military Doctrine between Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration, constitute the underlying causes of tension in Cyprus. Needless to say, the current Greek Cypriot policy of militarization seriously undermines efforts towards reducing tensions and building confidence between the two sides.

On behalf of the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, I wish to appeal to all parties interested in promoting a peaceful settlement in Cyprus to urge the Greek Cypriot side to cease forthwith all such provocative acts and concentrate on efforts towards creating an atmosphere which would be conducive to peace, stability and cooperation.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 62, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Aytuğ PLÜMER
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1998/975
20 October 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 OCTOBER 1998 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to the composition of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

The Government of Norway will be withdrawing its infantry battalion from UNIFIL at the end of November 1998. The Government of India has agreed to make available an infantry battalion to replace the Norwegian contingent.

Following the usual consultations, I propose that India be added to the list of Member States providing military personnel to UNIFIL.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

98-31262 (E) 201098

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/1998/976
20 October 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 OCTOBER 1998 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 16 October 1998 (S/1998/975) concerning your proposal to add India to the list of Member States providing military personnel to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They agree with the proposal contained in your letter.

(Signed) Jeremy GREENSTOCK
President of the Security Council

98-31268 (E) 201098

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1998/977
20 October 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 OCTOBER 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ETHIOPIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

With reference to the letter addressed to you by the Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the United Nations and its annex, the statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Eritrea, dated 14 October 1998 (S/1998/956), I have the honour to transmit to you a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia issued on 19 October 1998.

The above-mentioned statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Eritrea clearly shows the extent to which the Government of Eritrea goes to create confusion and to hoodwink the international community in connection with the Eritrean aggression against Ethiopia.

In this context, it is particularly evident that this latest statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Eritrea is designed to divert attention from the incontrovertible findings and conclusions of the Organization of African Unity Ministerial Committee that, "Badme town and its environs were administered by Ethiopia before 12 May 1998" and that "what happened in Badme between 6 and 12 May 1998 constitutes a fundamental element of the crisis" between the two countries.

I would be grateful if you could kindly circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Duri MOHAMMED
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Ethiopia to the United Nations

Annex

Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia issued on 19 October 1998

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia wishes to state the following in connection with the rather strange statement issued on 14 October 1998 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Eritrea.

1. There has been no map recently circulated by the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the diplomatic community, unless the reference is to a copy of a map made available to the diplomatic community in May of this year within days of the aggression by Eritrea. The purpose of the map was to indicate clearly, at the request of the diplomatic community, the area occupied by Eritrea on 12 May 1998, and the copy was based on maps used in Ethiopia for decades. As such, it is not a new map. However, true to form, the Eritrean authorities are playing their usual game of deception and duplicity with the international community.

2. The story about the recent wide distribution of the same map to Ethiopian schools and other government institutions is an Eritrean fabrication. Again, this is not new, either for the Eritrean Ministry of Foreign Affairs or for the Eritrean authorities.

3. The other parts of this odd statement, which as a whole is rather convoluted, are equally based on lies, distortions and fabrications apparently calculated to create confusion, which would only be dignified by a detailed response.

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1998/978
20 October 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 OCTOBER 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF POLAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to enclose the following letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, in his capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, dated 16 October 1998, informing you of the signing of the agreement between the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the Kosovo Verification Mission (see enclosure). I have the honour to request that the present letter, its annex and enclosure be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Eugeniusz WYZNER
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-31330 (E) 201098

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Annex

Letter dated 16 October 1998 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland addressed to the Secretary-General

I am writing to inform you that today I have signed, in my capacity as the Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the enclosed agreement between the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the Kosovo Verification Mission.

This agreement, together with the agreement on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-Kosovo Air Verification Regime signed yesterday at Belgrade, is aimed to support international efforts to solve the crisis in Kosovo and constitutes an important step towards the development of a political framework aimed at ensuring compliance with the demands set out in United Nations Security Council resolution 1199 (1998). The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe also took careful note of your report on the implementation of that resolution. The agreement highlights the verification of the compliance of the said resolution, as stipulated in its paragraph 16.

It is my understanding that the agreements will be acknowledged and supported by the Security Council in an appropriate resolution, in order to make these acts effective and to ensure the safety and security of international verifiers. I understand that your decision to send a mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia this weekend to assess developments on the ground and to continue reporting to the Security Council on the compliance by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with its resolutions 1160 (1998) and 1199 (1998), would not delay the decision on such a resolution.

Once this important political support is secured, I am ready to immediately begin deployment of the Kosovo Verification Mission on the ground. I have already decided to dispatch a small technical advance mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to start preparation of the operation, the scope of which goes beyond the previous experience of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. I am also considering a conclusion of an understanding/ agreement with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on cooperation with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in performing its tasks in Kosovo.

May I assure you, Mr. Secretary-General, of my awareness that the agreement is only a beginning of a new and decisive stage of a long process to solve the Kosovo crisis. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe stands ready to do its best in this regard, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

I sincerely hope that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe will enjoy the continued support of the United Nations in this process.

I will continue to keep you informed of further developments regarding the Kosovo crisis.

(Signed) Bronislaw GEREMEK

Enclosure

Agreement on the Kosovo Verification Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

- Devoted to the respect of the principles of the UN Charter and to the Principles of the Helsinki Final Act on peace, stability and cooperation in Europe, as well as to the Paris Charter,

- Considering in particular the importance of reaching a peaceful, democratic and lasting solution of all existing problems in the Province of Kosovo and Metohija, based on the equality of all citizens and national and ethnic communities,

- Devoted to the respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states in the region,

- Agreeing to comply with and willing to contribute to the FRY implementation of Resolutions 1160 and 1199 of the UN Security Council,

- The Federal Government of the FR of Yugoslavia, on one side,

- and, The OSCE, on the other,

- have reached the following

AGREEMENT

I *Establishment and Termination*

1. The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission will be established by the OSCE Permanent Council pursuant to a resolution of the United Nations Security Council calling upon OSCE to establish the Mission.

2. The FRY government has informed the OSCE Chairman-in-Office of its endorsement of the establishment of the Mission.

3. OSCE will request member states to contribute personnel and funding for the Verification Mission in accordance with established procedures.

4. OSCE will establish coordination with other organizations it may deem appropriate to allow the Verification Mission to accomplish all its objectives most effectively.

5. KDOM will act in place of the OSCE Verification Mission pending its establishment. Once OSCE is operational, KDOM will be absorbed by the Verification Mission.

6. The FRY government hereby guarantees the safety and security of the Verification Mission and all its members.

7. In the event of an emergency situation in Kosovo which in the judgment of the Mission Director threatens the safety of members of the Verification Mission, the FRY shall permit and cooperate in the evacuation of Verification Mission members.

8. The FRY government will accept the OSCE Verification Mission as a diplomatic entity in terms of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The Mission will enjoy the privileges and immunities conferred by such status, as will its members, in accordance with the Vienna Convention.

9. The FRY government and its entities will designate formal liaison officers to work with the Verification Mission in Belgrade, Pristina and field locations. The FRY, Serbian and Kosovo authorities will undertake to provide full cooperation and support to the Verification Mission. This will include, but not be limited to, billets, frequency or frequencies, visas and documentation, customs facilities, vehicle registration, fuel, medical support, airspace access for support aircraft and access to Belgrade, Pristina and other airports in accordance with normal procedures.

10. The OSCE and the FRY agree on a Verification Mission for one year, with extensions upon the request of either the OSCE Chairman-in-Office or the FRY government.

1. To verify compliance by all parties in Kosovo with UN Security Council Resolution 1199, and report instances of progress and/or non-compliance to the OSCE Permanent Council, the United Nations Security Council and other organizations. These reports will also be provided to the authorities of the FRY.

2. To establish permanent presences at as many locations throughout Kosovo as it deems necessary to fulfil its responsibilities;

3. To maintain close liaison with FRY, Serbian and, as appropriate, other Kosovo authorities, political parties and other organizations in Kosovo and accredited international and non-government organizations to assist in fulfilling its responsibilities;

4. To supervise elections in Kosovo to ensure their openness and fairness in accordance with regulations and procedures to be agreed. For the elections, the Mission may be augmented with elections support personnel;

5. To report and make recommendations to the OSCE Permanent Council, the UN Security Council and other organizations on areas covered by UN Security Council Resolution 1199.

III *Specific Terms of Reference*

1. The Verification Mission will travel throughout Kosovo to verify the maintenance of the cease-fire by all elements. It will investigate reports of cease-fire violations. Mission personnel will have full freedom of movement and access throughout Kosovo at all times.

2. The Verification Mission will receive weekly information from relevant FRY/Serbian military/police headquarters in Kosovo regarding movements of forces during the preceding week into, out of or within Kosovo. Upon request of the Verification Mission Director, Mission personnel may be invited to accompany police within Kosovo.

3. The Verification Mission will look for and report on roadblocks and other emplacements which influence lines of communication erected for purposes other than traffic or crime control. The Mission Director will contact the relevant authorities upon receipt of such reports. These authorities will explain the reasons for the emplacements or else direct that the emplacements be removed immediately. The Verification Mission will also receive notification should emergent circumstances lead to the establishment of a roadblock for other than traffic or crime control-related reasons. The Mission Director may request the removal of any roadblock.

4. The Verification Mission will maintain liaison with FRY authorities about border control activity and movement by units with border control responsibilities through areas of Kosovo away from the border. The Verification Mission, when invited by the FRY authorities or upon its request, will visit border control units and accompany them as they perform their normal border control roles.

5. When invited or upon request, the Verification Mission will accompany police units in Kosovo as they perform their normal policing roles.

6. The Verification Mission will, to the extent possible, assist UNHCR, ICRC and other international organizations in facilitating the return of displaced persons to their homes, the provision of facilitative and humanitarian assistance to them by the FRY, Serbian and Kosovo authorities as well as the humanitarian organizations and NGO's. The Mission will verify the level of cooperation and support provided by the FRY and its entities to the humanitarian organization and accredited NGO's in facilitating procedural requirements such as issuance of travel documentation, expedited customs clearance for humanitarian shipments and radio frequencies. The Mission will make such representations as it deems necessary to resolve problems it observes.

7. As the political settlement defining Kosovo's self-government is achieved and implementation begins, the Mission Director will assist, both with his own resources and with augmented OSCE implementation support, in areas such as elections supervision, assistance in the establishment of Kosovo institutions and police force development in Kosovo.

8. The Mission Director will receive periodic updates from the relevant authorities concerning eventual allegations of abusive actions by military or police personnel and status of disciplinary or legal actions against individuals implicated in such abuses.

9. The Verification Mission will maintain liaison with FRY, Serbian and, as appropriate, Kosovo authorities and with ICRC regarding ICRC access to detained persons.

10. The Mission Director will, as required, convene representatives of national communities and authorities to exchange information and provide guidance on implementation of the agreement establishing the Verification Mission.

11. The Mission Director will report instances of progress and/or non-compliance or lack of full cooperation from any side to the OSCE and other organizations.

IV *Composition and Facilities*

1. A Director, together with headquarters staff to be determined by Verification Mission requirements.

2. 2000 unarmed verifiers from OSCE member states will be permitted. Headquarters and support staff included in this total. The Mission may be augmented with technical experts provided by OSCE.

3. A headquarters in Pristina.

4. Field presence in locations around Kosovo to be determined by the Mission Director.

5. A small liaison office in Belgrade.

6. Vehicles, communications and other equipment along with locally-hired interpreters and support staff which the Director deems to be required for the performance of the responsibilities of the Mission.

V *Field Presence*

1. Coordination centers will be established in the capital of each *opstina* in Kosovo with specific areas of responsibility, under the Mission Director located in Pristina.

2. Many *opstina* coordination centers will have one or more sub-stations in smaller towns/villages in the *opstina*. The number and location of sub-stations will vary from *opstina* to *opstina*, depending on the verification environment and past conflict situation.

3. The chief of each coordination center will maintain a liaison relationship with the *opstina* authorities and the local leadership of the ethnic Albanian and other communities. Each sub-station will be responsible for coordination with the local authorities, including the local leadership of main ethnic groups.

4. The number of verification personnel assigned to each coordination center and sub-station would depend on the complexity of verification issues in the particular area.

5. Each coordination center and sub-station would have appropriately configured vehicles with which to patrol its assigned area of responsibility.

Done at Belgrade on 16 October 1998 in two original copies in the English and Serbian languages.

FOR THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

(Signed) H.E. Bronislaw GEREMEK
Chairman-in-Office

FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

(Signed) H.E. Zivadin JOVANOVIC
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Turkish military occupation forces on the island, constitute the underlying causes of tension in Cyprus.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 62, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Sotos ZACKHEOS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/980
20 October 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 OCTOBER 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith the English translation of the note verbale dated 27 September 1998 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Tehran.

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hadi NEJAD HOSSEINIAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Note verbale dated 27 September 1998 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Tehran

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Tehran and has the honour to state the following:

Relevant Iranian authorities have reported that on 6 April and 18 June 1998 a number of Iraqis on highly powered boats equipped with weapons intercepted and looted Iranian boats while fishing in the Abu-Safe area in the mouth of the Arvand River.

The Islamic Republic of Iran expresses its objection to such acts and requests that the Government of Iraq take the necessary measures to prevent the recurrence of such acts, which contravene the principle of good neighbourly relations and international law.

UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

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21 October 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-third session
Agenda items 20, 105 and 110
STRENGTHENING OF THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INCLUDING SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES: QUESTIONS RELATING TO REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS AND HUMANITARIAN QUESTIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Letter dated 20 October 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In addition to its flagrant and unprovoked aggression against Ethiopia, the Government of Eritrea is still continuing its massive and gross violation of the human rights of Ethiopians residing in Eritrea and those remaining in the occupied territories.

As clear evidence and testimony of the behaviour and acts of the Government of Eritrea, I have the honour to transmit to you a study and an analysis by M. Wray Witten, JD, MPA (Princeton University) under the title "The grave danger of illusions about Eritrea", concerning Eritrean aggression against Ethiopia as well as the violations of the human rights of Ethiopian nationals by Eritrea.

I also would like to inform you that the number of Ethiopians deported from Eritrea has now reached 27,866 and, in fact, is increasing day by day.

I should be grateful if you would kindly circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the fifty-third session of the General Assembly, under agenda items 20, 105 and 110, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Duri MOHAMMED
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

THE GRAVE DANGER OF ILLUSIONS ABOUT ERITREA

by M. Wray Witten, JD MPA

August, 1998

INTRODUCTION Since returning in June to my home in **Mekelle,** Tigray, Ethiopia, from teaching at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at **Princeton University,** I have been trying to understand the international community's perception of Eritrea's military invasion of Ethiopia. It is frankly amazing to me that Eritrea has not been strongly condemned, economically sanctioned, or otherwise pressured to withdraw its soldiers and settle peacefully whatever disputes may lie at the root of the invasion. But our hopes for Eritrea, and Eritrea's derivative ability to shade our analyses, have kept that from happening. Because we are still enthralled by the illusion of Eritrea, rather than repulsed by the emerging reality, the international community has actually played a role in bringing the coming war.

The gist of my understanding is as follows. Since 1991, we have interpreted the early ambiguous signs of Eritrean leadership in the most optimistic light, longing for a good outcome against all historical odds for such a revolutionary regime in this century. Now Eritrea has invaded and continues to militarily occupy areas of Ethiopia that I personally know Ethiopia has peacefully administered since 1992. Eritrea has shamelessly lied about this military action, and many people have accepted Eritrea's false statements that Ethiopia is the bad actor. But this invasion and this outright lying are new information, allowing us, indeed, forcing us to reassess our earlier optimism. Seeing Eritrea more clearly as a state embarked on outlaw behavior, charming as its public relations people may be, must cause us to realize that the situation the Ethiopian government faces is not as we thought.

Based on this new realization, we must conclude that the international community has failed in its role, failed to impress upon Eritrea that it must conform to international norms and withdraw its forces from the areas it invaded. As a result, a war in which tens of thousands are likely to die is upon us. When these people die their blood will be on our hands if we do not press the international community to take strong steps to force Eritrea to give up its military approach.

Thus, the purpose of my writing the following is to warn of the very real danger, the tens of thousands of deaths that will result and will be on our hands if we continue to accept a facile illusion of Eritrea. In doing so, I have no animosity towards the Eritrean people, only admiration and hope like most observers, hope for a constructive resolution, hope for the peaceful environment in the Horn of Africa that economic development requires.

NEW INFORMATION I had hoped that journalists would clearly present the facts of Eritrea's brutal invasion of Ethiopia, for I have no desire to become the target of Eritrea's ire as others who have crossed Eritrea have recently found themselves. But the journalists have not done so in a way that clearly reveals the path chosen by Eritrea's leader. It is true that I have an information advantage, having worked and lived for the last seven years in **Tigray,** the northern most Ethiopian State, sharing its long border with Eritrea, and having traveled in Eritrea extensively many times during the same period. But all of the following information is readily and publicly available information, hidden only by our hopes.

No one knows where the final border between Ethiopia and Eritrea will be located. But there is a great deal of information about the occupied areas prior to Eritrea's invasion and about what Eritrea has done. To begin with, there are two large areas administered for the last seven years by Ethiopia now occupied by force by heavily armed Eritrean soldiers. The first area is south and east of the **Badime River** in the Western Zone. I refer to it as **Badime**. The second area is the home of the primarily Catholic highland **Erob** people in the Eastern Zone,

which I refer to as Erob though the occupied area stretches west to **Zalanbessa**, the principle highland border crossing.

Badime is an extremely remote area, something like 400 square kilometers of "black cotton soil" without all-weather roads. Apparently the first infrastructure constructed in the area after the end of the Ethiopian civil war in 1991, was a set of village water supply wells fitted with hand-pumps. In June of 1992, I visited the first dozen completed wells. **UNICEF** funded the construction based on a proposal I helped write while working as a natural resources lawyer in the western United States. (I retired from the practice of law later in 1992.) The drilling was managed initially by the Ethiopian Water Works Construction Authority, monitored by the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) and an American PVO called the Water and Sanitation Consultancy Group (WSCG) of Denver, Colorado, of which I was then a member.

One of the new wells we visited was in a village of about 5,000 called **Adi Tsetser**, which I will use as an example. Eritrean soldiers now occupy Adi Tsetser by force, along with many other villages in the area we visited. When we visited it in 1992 it was clearly administered by the Tigray Regional (now State) and Ethiopian National (now Federal) governments, with which we worked closely, and the following evidence indicates that it has been ever since.

After 1992 other infrastructure improvements were built in Adi Tsetser, and in the other villages throughout the area now occupied. In 1995 and 1996 the community and the Tigray Bureau of Education collaborated to build an elementary school (initially only grades 1 and 2) staffed by teachers provided by the Bureau. In 1996 the Tigray Development Association (TDA), an Ethiopian NGO with which I have worked for many years, built a Health Center operated by the Tigray Bureau of Health. In 1997 the community of Adi Tsetser enrolled its primary school, one of five communities in the now occupied area to do so, in an extremely successful TDA program, funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), called the BESO program. The BESO program enlists

the community's support for improving their children's primary education by competitively awarding small grants and has enlisted a many-fold outpouring of community matching contributions. Finally, even at the time Eritrea invaded, **Karen Hanna Witten, MD MSPH,** to whom I am married, was working with nearby communities (around **Adi Da'iro**, which was not occupied) on a malaria control bednet program, a supplement to the long-standing malaria control program in the Badime area required by the extensive construction of small-scale irrigation dams in the area.

Throughout these years in Adi Tsetser and in the rest of the now occupied Badime area, Community Health Workers treated patients at the village level and filed reports every month; local judges decided cases that were appealed to district and state courts; local, state and federal representatives were elected. And very much the same can be said for the other villages in the Badime area. **No Eritrean national, state or local government was present.**

Erob area is much smaller on a map than Badime, but its steep slate mountainsides, which have only recently admitted vehicles, make it historically as remote as Badime and it might be as large in area if pressed flat. It lies east of the main border crossing at Zalanbessa, a border I have crossed many times during the seven years of peace. Until the beginning of May, 1998, the Eritrean border guards and their slowly improving buildings were always north of the town of Zalanbessa. **In May Eritrean soldiers took the town of Zalanbessa by force and told gullible journalists that Ethiopian soldiers had put up the long-standing border signs only recently.** At the same time they invaded and occupied the Erob lands to the east and tried to push south to the large town of **Adigrat**.

I first visited the Erob area in the winter of 1993-1994, and explored all the area now occupied with various hydro-geologists and engineers in 1994, 1995 and 1996, investigating indigenous soil and water conservation technologies. I walked for days each time through all but one of the villages now occupied by force by Eritrean soldiers. My

guides were local farmers organized by the **Catholic priest Father Hagos** who heads the **Adigrat Diocese Development Action (ADDA),** and ADDA's rural engineers who at that time worked with the farmers on both sides of the border, in Ethiopia and Eritrea. **The location of the border was well known to all because land allocations and use were governed by it.**

Throughout the area primary schools were enrolled in the TDA BESO project, Community Health Workers treated ill villagers and filed reports, and civil society generally proceeded as in Badime. **There were no Eritrean local, state or national governments present.**

In all, dozens of villages in Badime and Erob are now occupied by force by Eritrean soldiers. Some clinics and schools, such as those in the village of Badime, the Eritrean soldiers have wantonly destroyed, evidently actually believing they could expunge the hard evidence of Ethiopian governance and development. Local officials, elected in one of six elections that have taken place in the area under the Ethiopian Federal and Tigray State governments, have been publicly executed. The villagers--women and children and men (except those who have stayed to fight)--have been driven out of the areas at gunpoint.

Barely subsistence farmers to begin with, these poor people--poor beyond any possible appreciation in the West--left their meager crops in the fields, their simple churches to be looted, their basic houses to be torn apart for firewood, their one change of clothes, and walked out of the area carrying on their backs all they own, into a nightmare officially called "displaced."

The new information about Eritrea includes these brutal acts. But it also includes the information about what the Eritreans told the world about their attacks. Eritrea first claimed Ethiopia had invaded Eritrea; then, admitting it had been the aggressor, Eritrea claimed it was only taking back areas taken by Ethiopia by force six months before. These are both bald lies. Today Eritrea says its invasion is irrelevant and we should forget about it.

That is not the end of the new information about Eritrea, however. But it is instructive to review other new information in a comparative way.

CHOICES Exactly because so many revolutionary regimes in this century have succumbed to ideology and demagoguery and failed, it is instructive to compare the choices of the leaders of Eritrea and Ethiopia relevant to Eritrea's invasion:

Youth Training: Eritrea has a mandatory, centrally controlled military training program for all young men and women, effectively creating a militarized force throughout society answering to a small central group. It is these trainees who are most often described by those fleeing Eritrea as the people who inflict random violence. By comparison, Ethiopia has a voluntary, incentive driven youth training program, at the state level, training those young men and women who choose to join it in construction skills (a course I helped design, initially, as a TDA training program) and home health educators. Even now, in the face of war, the Ethiopian army seems able to re-staff its earlier demobilized army with paid volunteers.

Military Solutions: In the past couple of years, Eritrea has attacked all its neighbors, Yemen, Djibouti, Sudan, and now Ethiopia despite the fact that a joint Eritrean-Ethiopian Commission was actually meeting to discuss border issues at the time of the invasion. In the same period, Ethiopia has gained an international reputation for facilitating peaceful negotiations in the region.

Information: Eritrea, skilled at public relations, has baldly lied to the world about its invasion of Ethiopia. Ethiopia, often legitimately criticized for not explaining itself and not taking journalists seriously, immediately told the world it was under attack. Eritrea's president publicly criticized Ethiopia for doing so.

Escalation: Eritrea first attacked the Badime area during the period from May 6 to May 18. Not satisfied, Eritrea attacked the main border crossing at Zalanbessa and the Erob area to the east, trying to push south to Adigrat between May 31 and June 6. Still not satisfied, on June 5 Eritrea bombed the town of Mekelle where I live with cluster bombs, hitting the commercial airport once and twice hitting an area on the west side of Mekelle containing only houses, a large hospital under construction, a public housing facility where many of the State's mid-level managers live, and several schools. They hit the primary school and returned later the same day to bomb again, hitting the people gathered to attend to the dead and wounded. Still not satisfied, on June 9 the Eritreans launched another attack through Zalanbessa, on June 10 another through Badime, and on June 11 attempted to sever the road link between Ethiopia and the port at Djibouti far to the east with a third attack. Still not satisfied, on June 11 Eritrea bombed the town of Adigrat, killing civilians and hitting a food storehouse used by the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission to feed those forced from their homes by Eritrean forces. Eritrea claimed to have targeted a new pharmaceutical factory, a symbol of Ethiopian economic development, for military reasons. By comparison, Ethiopian militia and, eventually, regular army forces merely held their positions and repulsed later attacks but did not attempt to reclaim areas already occupied by force by Eritrea in Badime and Erob. On June 5 and 6 Ethiopia bombed the airforce base outside Asmara, a strictly military target.

Peace Process: Eritrea has rejected every effort at a peaceful settlement, except its own which is not supported by anyone but Eritrea. Ethiopia has accepted the settlement process proposed by the USA and Rwanda, the OAU, and the United Nations. The key difference is that Eritrea refuses to withdraw its troops from the areas it occupied by force in May and June, areas it falsely claims to have administered since the 1991. All the suffering and much of the ill will could have been stopped had Eritrea simply withdrawn its troops to pre-May 6 positions.

Many have speculated that Eritrea's escalation of the war and its intransigence towards resolution indicates that Eritrea is motivated by deeper issues than the border dispute, e.g., a desire to extract a more favorable economic relationship with its faster developing neighbor. If this is the case, it seems to me that the information we must appreciate in order to overcome our illusions about Eritrea is that Eritrea's idea of negotiating tactics is abhorrent.

Human Rights: Finally, apparently in an effort to divert attention from its aggression and the bald lies which have revealed it's new character to the world, Eritrea has attempted to shift the focus from its military attacks on the people of Ethiopia to human rights abuses of Eritreans in Ethiopia. This is by far the most difficult area to compare, and the most inflammatory. Frankly, I find the tangle of conventions on human rights, prisoners of war and other relevant conventions to be almost impenetrable, even though I sat for many years on American Civil Liberties Union panels that decide what cases it should take to protect American's civil rights. And, frankly, it seems to me extremely unlikely that either country has managed to avoid every ill treatment of the other's citizens, for there are heart-rending stories on all sides. Eventually, we may get better information (though not until the observers actually begin inspecting with something like objective skepticism on both sides) and we may then have some evidence of the statistics and characteristics of the incidents. At this time, it is only possible for me to compare the approach of the two countries, as reported by those fleeing from each country and by the two countries themselves.

Eritrea blithely claims to have taken no action at all against Ethiopians in Eritrea. But Ethiopians now fleeing Eritrea repeat the same horrors of systematic searches in the night, beating and torture, rape, burning, and murder. Observers have only been allowed in after the fact and only allowed to talk to people selected by the government. By comparison, Ethiopia publicly announced that it was taking action against certain groups of Eritreans living in Ethiopia, primarily for

security reasons after blunt Eritrean threats of attacks from within, and carried out the actions as announced, subject to oversight by already present international agencies.

Eritreans arriving in Eritrea seem to be complaining mostly of loss of property (which the Ethiopian government says it is protecting in accordance with international conventions), separation of families, and hardship, though certainly there have been some unfortunate cases. In reviewing the statements on both sides, I find I constantly must remind myself of the extreme poverty of both these countries, and to consider whether the conditions complained of are actually worse than the conditions most people, particularly the vast rural majority, suffer regularly in their lives.

However, whatever the merits of the competing claims of human rights abuses turn out to be, the key point to be remembered at all times is that any abuses there are start with the brutality of the Eritrean invasion, and continue solely because Eritrea refuses to withdraw from the areas it has occupied by force. Had Eritrea not invaded, had it withdrawn, if only it would withdraw, there would be no human rights issues.

ERITREA'S VIEW OF US One of the most interesting but appalling aspects of the new view of Eritrea provided by recent events is the revelation of what Eritrea thinks of the rest of us, what its leaders think we will accept in the way of Eritrean behavior. For example, to the UN Human Rights Commission, on 6 August 1998, in Geneva, Switzerland, the Eritrean representative stated the following as part of a prepared statement:

"I wish I could give a rational explanation for the actions of the Ethiopian Government over the last three months. Just ninety days ago, the mass expulsion of Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin was literally unthinkable. We pray that there is no more madness to come from those responsible for the protection of Ethiopian citizens and residents of whatever origin. Eritrea has nothing to seek except the promotion of the

lasting interests of the peoples of the two countries and the development of personal and cultural, socio-economic and political relations between them which will foster the profit and advantage of both and which shall not interfere with the peace and rights of either."

This is an incredibly disingenuous statement when placed in the context of the Eritrean invasion. It might be summarized as, We can't imagine why the Ethiopians are acting this way, when all we have done is invade them and launch organized disruption of Ethiopian society from within Ethiopia.

I must admit that I find Eritrea's disdainful attitude of manipulative superiority towards the world community to be one of the strongest indications of changes within the Eritrean leadership. What must they think of our perceptive abilities?

Imagine if Mexico occupied Texas and went to the UN to protest in these words the American retaliation (imagine the retaliation!) They would be laughed out of the hall for their sheer temerity. But we long so for Eritrea to beat the odds of demagoguery to which so many other such regimes have fallen that we have actually listened to them politely. Is it any wonder Eritrea has come to think we are a bunch of fools, as they obviously do?

PAST OBSERVATIONS RECONSIDERED In light of this new information about Eritrea, it is worth reconsidering our past observations to try to understand what was accurate and what was manipulated illusion. Journalists, political scientists and other government advisors have often drawn two conclusions about Eritrea in the past few years. After visiting both Ethiopia and Eritrea they would conclude that Eritrea was "governing better" than Ethiopia because in Eritrea there were no journalists in jail and no opposition parties complaining about the difficulties of political life, while in Ethiopia both were present in significant numbers. These conclusions were based on a line of reasoning that in Eritrea all the citizens were united in positive collective action, not just united against their historical oppressors. These were, of course, the conclusions the Eritreans accompanying these visitors sought to generate.

But these conclusions omitted consideration of valuable information, to the credit of the Eritrean's public relations capabilities.

The omitted information is important: In Ethiopia there are journalists in prison, but there is also as hearty a private opposition press written by the many Ethiopian journalists who are not in prison as anywhere in Africa. In Ethiopia, though there are still few members elected to parliaments from opposition parties, there are in fact numerous opposition political parties speaking out. In Eritrea opposition press and parties were prohibited.

[It is not my aim here to paint a heroic picture of Ethiopia. Ethiopia has many problems. But by comparison to almost any revolutionary government of this century, certainly to the now revealed Eritrea, Ethiopia's current government has made a surprising number of choices now thought to be good. Slowly bad decisions, such as over regulation of foreign investors, are giving way. But there are still lots of problems, particularly in areas of Ethiopia where democracy has not yet worked to make state and local government effective.)

One more piece of information is useful at this juncture: One of the correlations political scientists have been finding in recent years is the significantly lower likelihood of a democratic government attacking its neighbors than of a non-democratic government doing so. This turns out to be a pretty strong correlation, though depending somewhat on how you define democratic and other variables.

When we look at all the pieces of information about Eritrea we have today, might we now at least ask ourselves seriously whether Eritrea still deserves the image it once had, the treatment it once received? That the EPLF's leadership has always been concentrated in a small, unchanging group is well documented; nevertheless there seems little point in now wondering if we were wrong about Eritrea from the start. But has Eritrea changed?

- When Eritrea forced its youth into military training instead of development;

- When Eritrea built up the numbers of its trained military instead of demobilizing them;

- When Eritrean land use decision-making shifted from local governments to soldiers;

- When Eritrea failed to attract investors and actually lost many Eritrean investors to Ethiopia due to its insistence on the government being a partner in business (a prime reason, I am told by my Eritrean neighbors still living peacefully in Mekelle, as are the vast majority of Eritreans in Ethiopia, why there are so many Eritrean business people in Ethiopia);

- When Eritrea invaded its neighbors;

Shouldn't we wonder if these are the signs of yet another revolutionary government failing?

Shouldn't we ask ourselves if the image we had of Eritrea, of a high degree of voluntary collective action towards development (instead of just against a prior enemy), was real or an illusion?

Shouldn't we have asked ourselves, and shouldn't we ask ourselves now, if these are illusions, then what else is an illusion?

I think it is necessary to ask now, necessary to reconsider just what kind of government Eritrea is today. To understand the situation faced by the Ethiopians, to understand just how much Ethiopia needs the strong support of the international community today, we must understand what is across the trenches. For trenches there now are, on both sides, heavily fortified with hundreds of thousands of soldiers, tanks and howitzers, and landmines.

The evidence seems to clearly indicate that Eritrea has gone down an old path, the same one so many other failed revolutionary governments have gone down. Its own policies having failed to advance the causes its citizens seek to

advance, it has returned to rallying the troops to hide the internal shortcomings repressive governance so often seems to engender.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF ILLUSIONS What will be the consequences of our failure to reassess the Eritrean government, to see it as it is, to treat it as it deserves to be treated? The grave danger to Ethiopia, and to the Horn of Africa region, of Eritrea's outlaw behavior going unchecked is clear. If Eritrea is not severely enough pressured, and more, coerced into withdrawing its occupying forces, Ethiopia will have no choice but to push them out. Ethiopia can not justify allowing its citizens in the occupied areas to suffer at Eritrea's whim. (Again, imagine Texans under the boot of occupying Mexican soldiers.) Ethiopia has a duty to protect its citizens from such a fate. Ethiopia has shown remarkable restraint until now in seeking peaceful, non-military solutions. It has repeatedly sought the help of the international community to reach peaceful resolutions. But so far the international community has only rebuked Eritrea in the mildest tones. There has been no condemnation, no economic embargo, no threat brought against Eritrea. Instead, some have even glorified the Eritrean David fighting the Ethiopian Goliath, simple-mindedly mistaking this as a rerun of the Soviet-backed Ethiopia oppressing Eritrea, forgetting that it was the current Ethiopian government that, at great political cost to itself, supported the independence of Eritrea. And forgetting that it is Eritrea that has invaded all its neighbors.

I believe that when, not if, Ethiopia is soon forced to push Eritrea out of the occupied lands, the blood of the tens of thousands who will die will be on the hands of the international community, as it so often has been in this century, for taking inadequate action. I urge the international community to take the strongest possible action against Eritrea to prevent this. Eritrea must be seen as the bad actor it is in this situation and treated as such.

In particular, if the United States and the United Nations are sincere about peace and economic development in Africa, they must back up those sentiments with actions strong enough to wake Eritrea from its grand illusion.